Ideas from 'Causal Relations' by Donald Davidson [1967], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Essays on Actions and Events' by Davidson,Donald [OUP 1982,0-19-824637-4]].
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
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8349
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The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
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8348
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If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
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8347
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Explanations typically relate statements, not events
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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10371
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Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Schaffer,J]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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8403
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Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
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8346
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Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
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4778
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A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Psillos]
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